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INTRODUCTION: TEXAS USURY LAW-SOME
INTERESTING ANOMALIES.
SANFORD A. WEINER*
Texas usury laws involve an interesting series of anomalies, inconsistencies and failures to eliminate abuses while catching in the
legislative net a significant number of transactions that the Texas
legislature probably never intended to outlaw. The Declaration of
Legislative Intent, adopted in the 60th Legislature in 1967 as part
of a comprehensive revision of Texas laws relating to loans and
credit transactions, reveals a deep concern about the victimization
of Texas citizens, especially in the context of consumer credit transactions.' One finds it difficult to disagree with the Declaration of
Legislative Intent for it certainly embodies what the vast majority
of citizens would feel is a correct approach toward policy matters
relating to credit transactions and the compensation to those who
extend credit. The comprehensive scheme adopted by the 60th Legislature is a marked improvement over prior law.2 Unfortunately,
this legislation, the pre-1967 case law, subsequent case law and
subsequent statutory changes frequently fail to deal precisely with
the evils to be prohibited while punishing conduct that is far from
evil.
In a quick review of Texas usury statutes one frequently finds that
the highest rates of interest are allowed on loans to those most needy
and least able to protect themselves while those who need the least
protection are often subject to the lowest maximum interest rates.
An example of this is found in article 5069-7.031 dealing with the
finance charge limitations on motor vehicles. The purchaser of a
B.A., University of Texas; J.D., Harvard Law School.
1. See Declaration of Legislative Intent, 15 TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. 1, 1-2 (Vernon
*

1971).

2. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-1.01 to 50.06 (Vernon 1971).
3. See id. art. 5069-7.03.
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new domestic or foreign motor vehicle is subject to a maximum

add-on charge of seven and one-half percent per annum4 while one
who purchases a three or four year old car, presumably one whose
financial ability is likely to be less than the new motor vehicle purchaser, is subject to an add-on charge of twelve and one-half percent per annum.5 Furthermore, one who needs to borrow up to
$2,500.00 for personal and family necessities can be charged, under
the regulated loans chapter of the code, 6 a far higher rate of interest
than a multi-millionaire who borrows money for bqsiness purposes
in a context not covered by pre-1979 exceptions to the ten percent
ceiling suchas set forth in articles 5069-1.07(b) and (c) and article
5069-1.08.1 Another interesting example is that a small businessman who, for whatever reasons, has chosen to incorporate his
business can be required to pay up to eighteen percent per annum
on loans of $5,000 or more under article 1302-2.09 of the Texas
Miscellaneous Corporation Laws Act, 8 while a conglomerate of
multi-billion dollar corporations that forms a partnership for a
joint business endeavor and borrows hundreds of millions of dollars
may be subject to a ten percent ceiling if the Texas Attorney
General is correct in his Opinion No. H-589.1 The legislature, by
enacting Senate Bill 10 in 1979,0 thereby amending article 50691.07(b), has made considerable progress towards eliminating these
inconsistencies in the area of large business loans.
The study of usury laws can be divided into several steps. First
is the threshhold determination whether a given transaction is one
subject to the usury laws. Second is the determination of what compensation in connection with the transaction is considered "interest." Third are the computations and calculations that must be
made to determine whether a transaction, if it is subject to the usury
laws, is in compliance with or in violation of those laws. Fourth is
seeking some exemption or exception to the usury laws providing for
the transaction to be governed by a lower or higher rate than the
general law. Fifth is determining whether the transaction is one
4. See id. art. 5069-7.03(1).
5. See id. art. 5069-7.03(1).
6. See id. art. 5069-3.15(1).
7. See id. art. 5069-1.07(b)(c), 1.08 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
8. See id. art. 1302-2.09 (Vernon Supp. 1963-1978).
9. See TEX. Arr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-589 (1975) (partnership composed of two corporations
may not agree to interest in excess of ten percent per annum).
10. See 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 305, § 1, at 704 (Vernon).
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governed by the usury law of another jurisdiction either because the
parties specifically elect to be governed by the law of another jurisdiction or because, under general conflicts of law rules, the law of
another jurisdiction should be applicable. Finally, what procedures,
remedies and penalties are applicable in the determination of the
rights and remedies of the parties in a transaction found to be in
violation of the usury laws.
Under the first heading, the determination whether a given transaction is subject to the usury laws, one can look to the areas of sales
transactions, including revolving credit transactions and threeparty sales financing; leasing transactions, including sale-leaseback
transactions and three-party leasing; joint ventures and other equity investments, and a variety of other transactions such as bank
certificates of deposit and the sale of commercial paper. As an initial
proposition, the Texas courts have taken the position that a person
can charge, and can get the purchaser to pay, whatever he wishes
for the sale of his property. When the purchase price is not paid in
cash but is deferred, courts have looked carefully to determine
whether the purchaser was given a choice between a cash price
and a time price." The definition of "interest" in article 50691.01(a) specifically excludes the "time-price differential however
denominated arising out of a credit sale."" In the consumer' 3 and
motor vehicle' 4 context, time price differential is defined and regulated. Outside these two contexts, there appears to be no clear, definition or regulation of time-price differential. Despite some unfortunate dictum in Anguiano v. Jim Walters Homes, Inc.' 5 the recent
case of InternationalHarvester Co. v. Rotello'5 indicates the continuing vitality of the time-price doctrine. On the other hand, the
number of recent cases dealing with the interest charges on open
accounts indicates the unwillingness of the legislature and the
courts to exempt credit-sale transactions completely from the appli11. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Rotello, 580 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ); Standard Supply & Hardware Co. v. ChristianCarpenter Drilling Co., 183 S.W.2d 657, 661 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1944, writ refd);
Rattan v. Commercial Credit Co., 131 S.W.2d 399, 399-400 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1939, writ
ref'd).
12. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.01(a) (Vernon 1971).
13. See id. art. 5069-6.02(9).
14. See id. art. 5069-7.03(1).
15. 561 S.W.2d 249, 252 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). If the
transaction is actually a device to evade the usury law, it is not saved by any attempted
difference between a claimed 'cash' price and a claimed 'credit' price. Id. at 252.
16. 580 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ).
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cation of Texas usury laws. 7 Presumably, under the time-price doctrine a seller may charge several times the cash price for the privilege the purchaser obtains to pay the purchase price on a deferred
basis, at least so long as the cash price and the time price are clearly
known to the purchaser; but if the purchaser buys on a unitary
pricing basis and is then charged an amount to compensate the
lender for the credit the lender has tied up in his account and to
encourage rapid payment, the seller may forfeit the entire purchase
price of the goods. One questions the wisdom of this result. The
recent amendment to article 5069-1.03 has done little to change
this unfortunate result for the seller on open account who has
failed to get an agreement from his purchaser to pay interest.
In attempting to answer the threshhold question whether a lease
is a transaction subject to Texas usury laws, the Texas courts appear to have focused largely on the existence and terms of any
purchase option granted to the lessee. 8 If the lessee is required by
the agreement, either expressly or economically, to exercise the purchase option, then the courts may consider the transaction to be a
conditional sale involving interest payments." Again, one questions
whether the existence and terms of a purchase option should play
such a crucial role in the determination whether the impact of the
usury laws should be visited upon a given transaction.
In examining the second area, that of identifying the interest
involved in a transaction, one frequently asks the philosophical
question: is it more important what the borrower pays or what the
lender receives? Stated differently, is the purpose of the usury law
to protect the borrower from excessive cost of credit or to penalize
the lender receiving excessive compensation for the use, forebearance or detention of money? The author submits that the answer to
this question depends largely on the particular context in which it
is asked, and that the answer gleaned from the case law in one
context is largely inconsistent with and contradictory to the answer
in another context. For example, fees paid to third parties for serv17. See Houston Sash & Door Co. v. Heaner, 577 S.W.2d 217, 221 (Tex. 1979); Watson
v. Cargill, Inc., 573 S.W.2d 35, 40-42 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
18. See Southwest Park Outpatient Surgery, Ltd. v. Chandler, 572 S.W.2d 53, 55 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston flst Dist.] 1978, no writ); Tom Benson Chevway Rental & Leasing, Inc.
v. Allen, 571 S.W.2d 346, 348 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Davis Bros.
v. Misco Leasing, Inc., 508 S.W.2d 908, 912 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ); Security Life Ins. Co. v. Executive Car Leasing Co., 433 S.W.2d 915, 917-18 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
19. See Tom Benson Chevway Rental & Leasing, Inc. v. Allen, 571 S.W.2d 346, 348 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, writ refd n.r.e.); Davis Bros. v. Misco Leasing, Inc., 508 S.W.2d
908, 912 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ).
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ices rendered do not constitute interest even though they have the
effect of increasing the cost of credit to the borrower.10 Examples of
these services include the fees of the lender's independent counsel
in preparing loan documents, title policy premiums, surveyor's fees
and credit reports. 21 From a reading of these cases one concludes
that it is what the lender receives that is crucial. But one reaches
the opposite conclusion when looking at the area of payments made
by third parties. 2 From these cases, one would conclude that it is
what the borrower pays, and not what the lender receives, that is
most important.
Another example of the anomalies of Texas usury laws relates to
the fee paid to a third party for obtaining, and even guaranteeing,
the availability of a loan from a lender. If X arranged for a bank
to make a loan to Y, guaranteed the bank's loan to Y and obtained
a large fee from Y for obtaining and guaranteeing the loan, the fee
paid to X is not interest. But if X made the mistake of borrowing
the money from the bank and lending it to Y at a rate in excess of
the applicable usury ceiling, X would be subject to the usury penalties even if the net compensation to X was far less than X received
under the previous example.2
In the third area, relating to calculation and computation problems, Texas has been one of the leading states in the number of
cases reported by the appellate courts.24 For many decades Texas
has had two lines of cases existing side by side on the question of
spreading interest charges over the life of a loan. One line of cases
has held that interest is to be judged on a year-by-year basis and
not over the life of a loan. 5 The other line of cases, best exemplified
20. See Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex. 190, 195-96, 102 S.W.2d 1046, 1048-49 (1937).
21. See, e.g., Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex. 190, 195-96, 102 S.W.2d 1046, 1048-49 (1937);
Commerce Say. Ass'n v. GGE Management Co., 539 S.W.2d 71, 79 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.]), aff'd as modified, on other grounds, 543 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. 1976); Dewey v.
American Nat'l Bank, 382 S.W.2d 524, 528 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 861 (1965).
22. See Goodman v. Seely, 243 S.W.2d 858, 859-60 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1951,

writ refd).
23. Compare Home Say. Ass'n. v. Crow, 522 S.W.2d 457, 459-60 (Tex. 1975) (charges
imposed by broker for arranging loan from third party lender to borrower not interest) with
Walker v. Ross, 548 S.W.2d 447, 452 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth)(charges imposed by lender
for obtaining funds subsequently loanid to debtor are interest), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam,
554 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. 1977).
24. See Annot., 84 A.L.R. 1269, 1286-90 (1930).
25. See Commerce Trust Co. v. Ramp, 135 Tex. 84, 87, 138 S.W.2d 531, 533 (1940);
Shropshire v. Commerce Farm Credit Co., 120 Tex. 400, 405-06. 30 S.W.2d 282, 283-84 (1930),

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

5

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 10 [2022], No. 4, Art. 1

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 10:687

8 has held that interest was to be judged over
by Nevels v. Harris,"
the full period of the time that the borrower had the use of the
money. 7 The Texas Supreme Court has finally resolved this dispute
by adopting the Nevels v. Harris spreading rule and overruling the
no-spreading rule set forth in Commerce Trust Co. v. Ramp.I In the
area of acceleration clauses, Texas has also been a leader in the
number of cases. 2' Many of these cases involved the acceleration
clauses used by a particular lender. 0 In the consumer credit area,
recent cases involving acceleration by the holder of a consumer
credit contract have dealt with the concept of "charging" usurious
3
interest.
The fourth area of study is determining the applicable interest
rate ceiling or, stated differently, determining whether a transaction
is subject to a rate different from the general interest ceiling, which,
in Texas, is ten percent per annum. In the consumer context, a
variety of higher rates are permitted; such as in chapter 3,32 dealing
with small loans; chapter 5,33 dealing with secondary mortgage
loans; chapter 6,11 dealing with retail installment sales; and chapter
51,1 5 the Texas Pawnshop Act. In addition, higher rates are permitted in contexts sometimes thought of as consumer-oriented but
which are not expressly limited to consumer transactions, such as
cert. denied, 284 U.S. 675 (1931); Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Hockley County Seed & Delinting,
Inc., 511 S.W.2d 724, 732 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 516 S.W.2d
136 (Tex. 1974).
26. 129 Tex. 190, 102 S.W.2d 1046 (1937).
27. Id. at 196-97, 102 S.W.2d at 1049; see, e.g., Adleson v. B.F. Dittmar Co., 124 Tex.
564, 566-67, 80 S.W.2d 939, 940-41 (1935); Eubanks v. Simpson, 90 S.W.2d 291, 291-92 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1936, writ ref'd); Southern States Mortgage Co. v. Lykes, 85 S.W.2d 780,
783 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1935, writ ref'd).
28. See Tanner Dev. Co. v. Ferguson, 561 S.W.2d 777, 786-87 (Tex. 1977); Commerce
Trust Co. v. Ramp, 135 Tex. 84, 87, 138 S.W.2d 531, 533 (1940); Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex.
190, 196-97, 102 S.W.2d 1046, 1049 (1937).
29. See Annot., 66 A.L.R.3d 650, 667 (1975).
30. See, e.g., Temple Trust Co. v. Sewell, 133 Tex. 417, 422-24, 126 S.W.2d 943, 946-47
(1939); Temple Trust Co. v. Powers, 133 Tex. 426, 428, 126 S.W.2d 947, 948 (1939); Walker
v. Temple Trust Co., 124 Tex. 575, 579-80, 80 S.W.2d 935, 937 (1935).
31. See Commercial Credit Corp. v. Chasteen, 565 S.W.2d 342, 344-45 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Uresti, 553
S.W.2d 660, 663 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Moore v. Sabine Nat'l Bank,
527 S.W.2d 209, 211-12 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
32. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-3.15(1) (Vernon 1971).
33. See id. art. 5069-5.02(1).
34. See id. art. 5069-6.02(9).
35. See id. art. 5069-51.12 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
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chapter 4,36 dealing with installment loans, and chapter 7,37 dealing
with motor vehicle sales. Also, under the Texas Credit Union Act,
article 2461, members can be charged up to one percent per month
on loans. The most common business exceptions to the ten percent
ceiling are the corporate exception,39 article 1302-2.09 (permitting
rates of up to one and one-half percent per month on corporate loans
of $5,000 or more), article 5069-1.07(b)' (dealing with certain real
estate loans of $500,000 or more), article 5069-1.07(c)" (dealing with
certain oil and gas loans of $500,000 or more), and article 5069-1.0842
(dealing with margin accounts). The recently enacted Senate Bill
10 amends article, 5069-1.07(b) to lower the threshhold dollar
amount to $250,000 and to greatly expand the types of transactions
covered.'3 Article 5069-1.09" attempts to exempt FHA and VA loans
from the operation of Texas usury law so long as the loans are in
compliance with the federal statutes, rules and regulations relating
to FHA and VA loans. In addition, article 5069-1.03, 5 dealing with
the "legal" rate (i.e., the rate of interest applicable in the absence
of an agreement by the parties about the rate of interest) sets a six
percent rate and on open accounts provides for the six percent to
commence on the January 1 after the "same are made.""
If one steps back from this hodge podge of exceptions to the general ten percent rule, the first observation one reaches is that on
small transactions consumers can be charged far greater rates of
interest than can businesses. At least on the surface this appears to
reach a result contrary to the concerns of the legislature as set forth
in the Declaration of Legislative Intent. 7 A second, and closely related, observation is that the smaller the loan and the more
necessitous the borrower, the less protection the borrower receives
in the form of a maximum interest rate. Again, this appears inconsistent with the Declaration of Legislative Intent. In fairness to the
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. art. 5069-4.01(1)(Vernon 1971).
id. art. 5069-7.03(1)(Vernon 1971).
id. art. 2462, § 5 (Vernon 1965).
id. art. 1302-2.09 (Vernon Supp. 1963-1978).
id. art. 5069-1.07(b)(Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
id. art. 5069-1.07(c)(Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
id. art. 5069-1.08(Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 305, § 1, at 704 (Vernon).
TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.09 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).

45. See id. art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon 1971).
46. See id. art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon 1971). But see 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 707,
§ 1, at 1718 (Vernon) (amending article 5069-1.03 so that interest may accrue 30 days after
account becomes due).
47. See Declarationof Legislative Intent, 15 TEx. REV. Cir. STAT: ANN. 1, 1-2 (Vernon
1971).
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legislature, it should be noted that smaller loans to necessitous
borrowers frequently involve higher risks and higher administrative costs per dollar loaned than larger business loans. By allowing
higher rates on these smaller loans, the legislature has attempted
to encourage banks and other reputable financial institutions,
subject to regulation, to enter a segment of the market which may
otherwise have been left to unscrupulous individuals. A third observation is that a number of these special provisions are applicable
only when certain conditions are met and reasonable men could
differ in an, overall view whether these various conditions make
sense. For example, under chapter 4 a lender may not take a lien
upon real estate as security for any loan made under that chapter"
whereas in chapters 5 and 6, a lender who wishes to charge more
than ten percent per annum may not take a first lien upon real
estate to secure the loan." By contrast, article 5069-1.07(a), dealing
with spreading, is applicable only to loans secured by a lien on or
interest with respect to real property. 50
Another interesting observation relates to a comparison of the
corporate usury statute with the statutes dealing with large real
estate loans, large oil and gas loans and margin account transactions. Presumably, the reason that corporate loans are subject to a
higher rate is the notion that businessmen do not need the same
protection as consumers. No dollar threshhold amount is necessary
for the application of article 5069-1.08 dealing with margin accounts.5 ' Presumably, one who is sophisticated enough to dabble in
the stock market and convince a registered broker-dealer to extend
him credit needs less protection than others. Article 5069-1.07(c)
requires a $500,000 threshhold amount before it applies.52 Article
5069-1.07(b), prior to its recent amendment, also required a
$500,000 minimum amount.53 The author submits that there is no
valid reason why the choice by a businessman to do business in the
corporate form-as opposed to as an individual or partnership-is
in any way rationally related to the degree of protection to which
he should be entitled or, conversely, the amount of compensation
that should flow to those who provide him with credit. This is
brought home especially in the area of tax-sheltered investments,
48. See TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-4.04(2)(Vernon 1971).
49. See id. art. 5069-5.01(1), 6.05(7).
50. See id. art. 5069-1.07(a)(Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
51. See id. art. 5069-1.08 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
52. See id. art. 5069-1.07(c)(Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
53. See id. art. 5069-1.07(b)(Vernon Supp. 1978-1979); 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.,
305, § 1, at 704 (Vernon).
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which are very frequently structured as partnerships. For example,
there is no rational reason why the comer druggist who does business in the corporate form, has a net worth of $10,000 and wishes to
borrow $5,000 should be considered more sophisticated and less in
need of protection than a public limited partnership drilling fund
that does not qualify for the rather rigid requirements of article
5069-1.07(c). 54 Nor is there any reason why an individual or partnership or business trust, such as a real estate investment trust, borrowing large sums of money on an unsecured basis should be entitled to more protection than the corner druggist. Stated differently,
there is no reason why those particular transactions for which statutes provide higher rates comprise a complete "shopping list" of
categories of transactions in which a higher rate is necessarily appropriate. The enactment of Senate Bill 10,11 providing for rates of
up to eighteen percent per annum on loans of $250,000 or more other
than certain residential and agricultural and ranching loans will
bring a great deal more sense into the general area of exemptions
from the ten percent ceiling. Still there remains a question why the
choice of a non-corporate format of doing business suggests the need
for a loan of fifty times the threshhold amount set forth in Article
1302-2.0911 to the applicability of the higher rate, especially in light
of the numerous recent Texas cases permitting a lender to require
that the borrower incorporate as a condition to getting a loan and
even guarantee payment of the loan. 5
One analyzing a transaction under Texas usury laws should consider whether Texas law is indeed applicable to the transaction.
Texas has a number of cases dealing specifically with the conflicts
of law question in the usury context. Texas courts have recognized
even in the usury context that the parties may choose the law applicable to the transaction in which they are engaging at least so long
as the jurisdiction whose law is chosen has a reasonable relationship
to the transaction. 8 Virtually all twentieth century Texas usury
conflicts of law cases have held, in the absence of an agreement by
54. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07(c)(Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
55. See 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 305, § 1, at 704 (Vernon).
56. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09 (Vernon Supp. 1963-1978).
57. See, e.g., Hutchison v. Commercial Trading Co., 427 F. Supp. 662, 665-66 (N.D. Tex.
1977); Houston Furniture Distrib., Inc. v. Bank of Woodlake, 562 S.W.2d 880, 882-83 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ); American Century Mortgage Investors v.
Regional Center, Ltd., 529 S.W.2d 578, 582 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ refd n.r.e.).
58. See, e.g., Dugan v. Lewis, 79 Tex. 246, 250-51, 14 S.W. 1024, 1025 (1891); Hi Fashion
Wigs Profit Sharing Trust v. Hamilton Inv. Trust, 579,S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1979, no writ); Securities Inv. Co. v. Finance Acceptance Corp., 474 S.W.2d
261, 271 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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the parties about which jurisdiction's law should govern, that the
determination whether a transaction is usurious is made by reference to the law of the place where the obligation is payable." However, the "sham, guise or subterfuge" exceptions alluded to in
Securities Investments Co. v. Finance Acceptance Corp.," and
Building & Loan Ass'n v. Griffin,"' suggest some limitation on the
ability to contract out of the applicability of Texas usury laws.
The penalties enacted in 1967 for a violation of Texas usury laws
are, at a minimum, Draconian."2 By visiting upon the violator a
penalty of twice the amount of interest contracted for, charged or
received, the legislature inadvertently made the usury penalty more
directly proportionate to the length of the loan than the severity of
the violation, at least so long as the lender did not exceed double
the usury ceiling." The Texas Supreme Court, in Wall v. East Texas
Teachers Credit Union," engrafted onto the statutory penalty an
additional forfeiture by making the obligation of the borrower to pay
interest unenforceable. 5 The author submits that this result is directly contrary to the statute and reimposes the penalty as it existed
prior to 1967. This is particularly troublesome inasmuch as the pre1967 penalty, making the obligation to pay usurious interest unenforceable, was specifically repealed." As the courts went further in
exploring the idea opened up in Wall, they confronted the uneasy
question how to deal with the borrower who had already paid some
of the interest." Thus, a lender who had contracted for slightly more
than ten percent per annum on a 30 year $50,000 home mortgage
loan could suffer a forfeiture, including the inability to collect any
interest, of more than $323,000, while a lender who charged 19.99%
on a one-year $50,000 loan providing for no amortization would
59. See, e.g., Lubbock Hotel Co. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 77 F.2d 152, 155-56 (5th
Cir. 1935); Wade v. Darring, 511 S.W.2d 320, 321 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1974, no writ); Apodaca v. Banco Longoria, S.A., 451 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
60. 474 S.W.2d 261, 271 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
61. 90 Tex. 480, 488, 39 S.W. 656, 659 (1897).
62. See TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06 (Vernon 1971).
63. See id.
64. 533 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1976).
65. Id. at 921.
66. Compare 1963 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 205, § 27, at 550 (usurious contracts void with
regard to interest) with TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.04 (Vernon 1971) (contracts for
usury subject to appropriate penalties).
67. See First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572, 576-77 (Tex. 1978); Ferguson v.
Tanner Dev. Co., 541 S.W.2d 483, 495-96 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston list Dist.] 1976), rev'd
on other grounds, 561 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1977).
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forfeit approximately $30,000. One finds it difficult to believe that
any legitimate purpose is served by tying the amount of the penalty
to the length of the loan rather than the severity of the violation.
House Bill 616,68 enacted in the latest session of the Legislature,
should bring more sense into the usury law by imposing a penalty
of three times the usurious portion of the interest contracted for,
charged or received.
In conclusion, one studying Texas usury law cannot help but be
impressed by the anomalies and inconsistencies and the degree to
which conduct that should be severely punished is only mildly punished or not punished at all while conduct that should not be punished is frequently severely punished. The following articles deal
with a few of the current issues in Texas usury law. The first is a
brief examination of the newly enacted "large loan" statute, dealing
with some of the ambiguities in the prior statute and the reasons
for the wording of the amendment. The second article examines the
issue of interest charges on open account transactions. Recent case
law, as well as legislative action, have made a close inspection of all
open account interest charges a necessity. The effects and liabilities
that may arise from issuing legal opinion letters concerning usury
are examined in the third article. The authors deal with various
ambiguities in the usury area, and suggest language to be used in
issuing these opinions. Another current topic in usury law, that of
spreading interest, is discussed in detail in the final article of this
symposium. The author traces the judicial history of spreading, and
examines a number of the methods in current use for calculating
interest rates and maximum permissible front-end fees. The symposium concludes with a student survey of Texas case law dealing
with usury. This survey covers various aspects of usury including
the elements of usury, practice and procedure in usury cases, remedies and defenses to usury, and an analysis of the fees or other
benefits to the lender that might be deemed to be interest by the
courts.
68. See 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 281, § 1, at 604 (Vernon).
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